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ABSTRACT    
   
The competitive situations within the Australia, 
Hong Kong and Singapore construction 
market environments are compared by 
observing the contractors’ decision to bid 
behaviour according to two extreme market 
conditions (i.e. booming and recession) and 
different number of bidders scenarios (ranging 
from 4 to 30).  Data were collected via a 
designed experiment so as to make direct 
comparisons possible. This study provides 
evidence that contractors’ decision to bid 
behaviour varies in different market 
environments. Inline with decreasing 
probability of winning, the ‘bid’ responses of 
the three groups of contractors decrease as 
the number of bidders increases. However, all 
Australian respondents declined to bid when 
the number of bidders exceeded 10, even in 
recession. This is in stark contrast to Hong 
Kong and Singapore where about 30% of 
respondents were willing to bid in competitions 
containing 30 bidders, even in boom periods. 
In addition, the ‘bid’ responses of Australia 
were higher in booming than in recession 
times when the number of bidders, N ≤ 4. The 
Hong Kong construction market environment 
was found to be the most competitive with 
considerably higher proportions of ‘bid’ 
responses; this was followed by the Singapore 
and Australia, respectively. 
Keywords: bidding, decision to bid, Australia, 
Hong Kong, Singapore 
INTRODUCTION    
Contractors adopt various strategic 
approaches in their decision to bid to enhance 
chances of winning work. They do not always 
bid for every job that comes along but to select 
from a continually changing array of potential 
projects (Odusote and Fellows 1992). Male 
(1991) suggests that contractors define a 
strategic domain at the corporate strategy level 
with the domain establishing the market 
dimensions within which contractors plan to 
operate and compete for work. Contractors 
then make decisions on which contracts to bid 
for at business strategy level. The strategic 
domain within which contractors compete for 
work can be defined by different parameters 
including the degree of complexity and size of 
project, the types of contractual arrangement 
and geographical area (Hillebrandt 2000).  
The environment, however, has an especially 
dominant influence on the construction market 
and, hence, on the contractors’ competitive 
strategies (Pries and Janszen 1995). They 
equated ‘environment’ with the ‘governmental 
regulations’ that form the centre forces in 
influencing the construction market. The 
government acts as the industry regulator (e.g. 
environmental, financial and technical 
regulations) and balances the construction 
demand and supply via building approval 
quotas, business licensing conditions and 
procurement methods. Consequently, the 
governmental regulations exert varying 
degrees of influence on competition in the 
industry that can be represented along the 
continuum of high-low. In Australia, for 
example, the competitive situation within the 
construction industry is highly regulated. The 
Australian Government have published sets of 
codes of practice together with implementation 
guidelines dealing with tendering issues both 
at the national and state or territory levels (e.g. 
The New South Wales Government Code of 
Practice for Procurement). Whilst at the low 
end, bidding competition flourishes in the free 
market environment in Hong Kong with little 
intervention from the government on any 
trades. Contrary to Hong Kong, it appears that 
the Singapore Government intervention on 
competition may fall somewhere along the 
high-low continuum since the government 
resumes a more active role in shaping the 
competition in the construction industry (Ofori 
and Chan 2001). One of the major issues a 
contractor faces when bidding is how to 
approach the competitive situation, which may 
be subjected to varying degrees of 
government intervention on competition. Dyer 
et al. (1989) suggest that success in bidding 
competition is in part a function of knowledge 
about a particular market environment. 
This paper compares the competitive 
situations within the Australia (AUS), Hong 
  
 
Kong (HK) and Singapore (SIN) construction 
market environments. The focus is on 
comparing contractors’ decision to bid 
behaviour according to different market 
conditions and number of bidders. The specific 
objectives are to: (i) compare the contractors’ 
willingness to bid in situations of varying 
competition intensity (number of bidders) at 
the times of two extreme market conditions, i.e. 
boom times with low need for work, and 
recession times with high need for work; and (ii) 
compare the corresponding ‘bid’ responses 
among the three groups of contractors.  
DECISION TO BID, MARKET CONDITIONS 
AND NUMBER OF BIDDERS   
One of the major issues a contractor faces in 
bidding is deciding whether or not to compete. 
Bid/no-bid decision (also known as project 
selection) is a vital and recurring strategic 
decision for construction firms given that a 
significant portion of industry workload is let by 
competitive bidding. Thorpe and McCaffer 
(1991) highlight that contractors strive to 
balance market opportunities and risk in their 
decision to bid. They go on to point out that 
contractors will try to avoid contract that is too 
large for their size, beyond their experience 
range and normal geographical area of 
operation, and the contract is likely to stretch 
their available resources including cash. 
Skitmore (1989) classified the contractors’ 
project selection objectives into three main 
headings, namely monetary, non-monetary 
and market-related objectives. The monetary 
objectives are concerned with the desired 
changes in levels of monetary resources, i.e. 
in terms of profit or profitability. Also, the 
identified non-monetary objectives include: to 
keep the resources occupied, to serve the 
client well, to maintain and improve quality and 
services; and finally, market-related objectives 
are: to increase market share, to stay in 
existing markets and to penetrate new markets. 
According to Econ (2004), two important 
factors take place in a bidding competition are 
market conditions and number of bidders. 
These two factors have also been identified as 
important in separate surveys, undertaken by 
Ahmad and Minkarah (1988), Shash (1993) 
and Fayek et al. (1998). The prevailing market 
conditions oscillate between periods of 
economic boom and recession. Thorpe and 
McCaffer (1991) regard market conditions as a 
subjective term which on a macro-industry 
level includes such factors as the total 
construction order for all type of works and 
construction price levels whilst on a micro-
company level includes competitor activity and 
construction opportunities in local, national 
and international markets. De Neufville et al. 
(1977) found that market conditions strongly 
affect contractors’ bidding behaviour and 
provide evidence of a relationship between the 
market conditions and intensity of competition 
(i.e. number of competing bidders). The 
authors found that less bids were recorded in 
what they refer to as ‘good’ years whereas 
competition becomes fierce in ‘bad’ years 
when fewer projects are available.  
The number of bidders is the key variable in 
probabilistic approach for construction pricing 
as defined by Friedman’s (1956) tendering 
theory. Akintoye and Skitmore (1992) suggest 
that the number of competing bidders reflects 
the capacity of the industry in terms of ‘active’ 
market players capable to undertake a project, 
and thus provides a measure of degree of 
competition in the industry. De Neufville and 
King (1991) highlight that contractors are 
reluctant to bid in competition consisting large 
number of bidders as probability of winning 
decreases, this will also increases contractors’ 
overheads and ultimately costs the owners 
more. Highly correlated with the number of 
bidders are the bidding costs. There has been 
much debate on the ideal number of bidders 
given its direct bearing on bidding costs (e.g. 
Flanagan and Norman 1985, Wilson et al. 
1987, de Neufville and King 1991). Ngai et al. 
(2002) suggest that clients should vary the 
minimum number of bidders in any new 
bidding situation with prevailing market 
conditions in order to obtain the most 
competitive bids in the most cost-efficient way. 
Runeson (2000), on the other hand, argues 
that the question whether the number of 
bidders is independent of market conditions or 
is it a function of market conditions may not be 
so important since empirical studies have 
shown quite conclusively that contractors’ 
bidding behaviour is significantly affected by 
number of bidders (e.g. Carr 1983, King and 
Mercer 1990, Skitmore 2002).   
INDUSTRY STRUCTURES  
AUS, HK and SIN were chosen for comparison 
in this study mainly on the basis that they have 
a Commonwealth background, and that the 
construction industries are based on British 
model. The traditional procurement of design-
bid-construct predominates in the industries in 
which competitive bidding is used extensively 
as mechanism for job distribution.  
The construction industry structures of AUS, 
HK and SIN share the dominant structural 
characteristics of the construction industry 
wherein: 
  
 
(i) there are large number of small firms 
and comparatively few large 
companies in the industry; 
(ii) competitive subcontracting is well-
established and used extensively in 
project delivery; and 
(iii)  the government being the dominant 
client act as the industry regulator. 
At the end of June 2003, there were 339,982 
construction businesses operating in AUS, but 
only 1,354 of the construction firms earning 
A$10 million or more that made up 42.1% of 
the total turnover of the industry (Australian 
Bureau of Statistics 2004). Given its large 
geographical area, the vast majority of 
construction firms in AUS are state-based, and 
often only in one region within that state 
(Underhill 2003). On the other hand, the size 
and variety of construction projects in SIN and 
HK are constrained by the city states’ small 
physical size. The HK Census and Statistics 
Department (2004) estimated that the total 
number of construction-related establishments 
in HK approaching 20,000 in 2002, whereas 
there are 60 firms eligible to public contracts 
above HK$ 50 million (Environment, Transport 
and Works Bureau 2005). In SIN, there are 
5,327 construction-related firms as listed in the 
Singapore Building Construction Authority’s 
(BCA) Contractors Registry (2005). Of these, 
only 40 firms from both the building and civil 
engineering sectors are of unlimited tendering 
limits. These figures on number and size of 
firms serve as an indicator of the degree of 
competition within the industries.  
COMPETING IN AUSTRALIA, HONG KONG 
AND SINGAPORE 
In comparing the three countries/territories, 
AUS has a prosperous Western-style capitalist 
economy. The Australian Government is 
committed to ensuring that the industry 
continues to strive to attain its maximum 
potential in ways that are productive, flexible 
and fair (Department of Employment and 
Workplace Relations 2006). The commitment 
of Australian Government is well reflected in 
the publication of codes of practice and 
implementation guidelines for the industry, 
both at the national and state or territory levels. 
In July 2005, the announcement on further 
extension to the application of the industry 
codes and guidelines with mandatory effect to 
all entities tendering for or expressing interest 
in construction projects directly or indirectly 
funded (including privately funded Australian-
based construction projects) by the Australian 
Government (Department of Employment and 
Workplace Relations 2006), perhaps is the 
most significant shift towards highly regulated 
Australian construction industry. With this in 
mind, the influence of the Australian 
Government on the industry is strong 
(Department of Industry, Science and 
Resources 1999), which shapes the risks and 
the nature of competition that the construction 
firms experience. It is worth noting that the 
implementation guidelines advocate for 
embracing ethical principles in competitive 
behaviour towards reduced cost and 
continuous improvement in bidding process 
(Australian Procurement and Construction 
Council 1999). Pre-qualification is practised for 
majority of the public sector work (Davis 
Langdon and Seah 200). Wilson et al. (1987) 
found that there were 4.81 bidders per project 
in average for open bidding of number of 
bidders ranging from one to maximum of 
seventeen bidders per project, and only 5% of 
the 286 project data sample attracted more 
than ten bids.  
HK operates a laissez faire economy with a 
clear political, legal and ethical business 
environment that is favoured by foreign firms 
(Lasserre and Probert 1998), not to mention 
the government has not placed any legal or 
institutional restrictions on the entry of foreign 
contractors. The government intervention in 
economic matters based on the laissez faire 
economic policy is mostly confined to 
regulating against force and fraud among 
market participants. Large numbers of 
contractors are often encouraged to bid in HK. 
For example, a recent public sector data set 
from year 1990 to 1996 identified that the 
number of bidders per project ranging from 3 
to 33 with an average of 14 bidders (Ngai et al. 
2002). The local construction market is thus 
highly competitive in which lowest bids tend to 
succeed, although price is not the only 
criterion for contractor selection. 
The SIN construction industry is well managed 
with large number of foreign contractors active 
in the market. A number of methods of 
competition have been employed by the 
foreign contractors in SIN including joint 
venture with local firms and provision of 
finance, new technologies and designs for 
projects (Ofori 1996). In contrast to the HK 
Government, the SIN Government resumes a 
more active role in shaping the operating 
environment and so the degree of competition 
in the construction industry (Ofori and Chan 
2001). They found that the local large 
construction firms have placed high emphasis 
on the government helps towards their growth. 
It is worth noting that most of the local 
construction firms are owned by Chinese 
  
 
Singaporeans and have a Chinese-oriented 
business structure (Ang and Ofori 2001). 
Above all else, the local construction market is 
highly competitive with long tenderer list in 
bidding competition. Oo and Drew (2005) 
identified that the number of bidders per 
project ranges from 6 to 31 with an average of 
15.7 bidders based on 46 public sector 
contracts from year 2002 to 2004. The 
intensity of competition in SIN construction 
market is beyond doubt and well demonstrated 
in which 28 bidders have bid for a design and 
build project, consisting both local and foreign 
contractors (The Straits Times 2004).  
The review suggests that government 
intervention on competition within the industry 
varies widely from country to country. It is 
beyond the scope of this paper to cover 
different sets of procurement procedures and 
rules; rather, we focus on the competitive 
situations within the three construction market 
environments that are subjected to varying 
degrees of government intervention by 
observing the contractors’ decision to bid 
behaviour.  
BIDDING EXPERIMENT METHOD 
Given the overall aim of comparing 
contractors’ decision to bid behaviour in AUS, 
HK and SIN, it was decided to develop a 
controlled design research game, i.e. a bidding 
experiment that permits the following: 
(i) direct comparisons among the three 
construction market environments;  
(ii) stricter control and active 
manipulation of variables; and 
(iii) examination of the effect of number 
of bidders on contractors’ decision to 
bid, as bid/no-bid decisions for 
several possible number of bidders 
scenarios are unobtainable in ‘real 
world’, where contractors only 
submit one-off bid in bidding for a 
project.  
The bidding experiment method adopted was 
developed from Dyer’s (1987) experimental 
design in which the author studied the effect of 
number of bidders on seller’s revenue by 
asking the experiment subjects to bid in two 
hypothetical scenarios of three and six bidders, 
respectively. In this case, the experimental 
approach increases the assurance that any 
changes in the outcome of decision to bid are 
a consequence of the interventions, i.e. 
changes in market conditions and number of 
bidders. In addition, the bidding experiment 
was complemented by follow-up interviews 
designed to avoid any significant omissions or 
misunderstandings of the bidding process, and 
to disclose contractors’ rationale in their 
decision to bid that would not otherwise have 
been revealed. It is worth noting that 
experimental approach has been used in 
construction bidding research as early as 1970 
by Hackemer (1970) and most recently by 
Drew and Skitmore (2006). Indeed, Meikle 
(1990) pointed out that several international 
comparisons of construction costs and prices 
are moving towards the adoption of 
experimental approach by engaging experts in 
each country.  
The experiment subjects are (i) Group C 
contractors listed in the HK Environment, 
Transport and Works Bureau’s (ETWB) List of 
Approved Contractors for Public Works (2005), 
and (ii) Group A1, A2 and B1 contractors listed 
in the SIN BCA Contractors Registry (2005). A 
desk study on past tender reports revealed 
that these groups of contractors are ‘active’ 
market players. All construction firms on both 
the ETWB and BCA lists were contacted and 
no conscious effort was made to exclude the 
listed foreign contractors. The AUS 
respondents, on the other hand, were 
recruited via personal contacts considering the 
large number of firms in the industry as 
highlighted earlier. Indeed, Fayek et al. (1998) 
used the same sampling approach in his 
Australian-based survey on tendering 
practices.  
Senior management of the construction firms 
with experience in bidding were invited to 
participate via email in the bidding experiment 
by (i) acting as senior managers of their 
construction firms, and (ii) bidding for a total of 
twenty projects. These were arranged in two 
rounds according to two extreme market 
conditions scenarios, i.e. (i) boom times with 
low need for work, and (ii) recession times with 
high need for work. This was done to obtain a 
distinctive comparison of results and to reflect 
the industry norm in which prevailing market 
conditions is seen as the proxy variable for the 
contractors’ need for work (de Neufville et al. 
1977). 
The twenty projects, based on past tender 
reports, are lump sum procurement of 
conventional projects. Apart from key 
information, such as project type, client and 
location, respondents were also given an 
identical cost estimate derived from the lowest 
bid prices in past tender reports and they were 
required to decide which jobs to bid for. 
Changes were made to the experimental 
instrument as necessary to reflect the local 
bidding practices, for example, the term 
‘conversion and extension’ was referred to 
upgrading and maintenance jobs for HK, 
  
 
whereas the term ‘addition and alteration’ and 
‘alteration’ were used for SIN and AUS, 
respectively. Considering the possible number 
of bidders scenario, the estimated number of 
bidders for the AUS case increasing in the 
level of 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 15 and 20 as compared 
to N = 4 to 30 for HK and SIN (i.e. 4, 6, 8, 10, 
14, 18, 24 and 30). This was done to reflect 
the local competitive situation as the maximum 
number of bids received was 17 for AUS 
(Wilson et al. 1987), 33 for HK (Ngai et al. 
2002) and 31 for SIN (Oo and Drew 2005). In 
addition, these intervals enable a close 
examination of bidding patterns when there is 
less number of bidders, and to reduce the 
repetitive nature of the experiment since 
divergence in bidding decisions is expected to 
be less noticeable if there are too many 
bidders (Wilson et al. 1987). Respondents 
were asked to bid up to the bidding scenarios 
of N bidders that they wish to bid. 
EXPERIMENT LIMITATIONS   
Setting up a bidding experiment which is an 
exact replica of the commercial construction 
industry is extremely difficult, if not impossible 
to do, since there are so many possible factors 
affecting decision to bid (e.g. Egemen and 
Mohamed (2007) identified 83 decision to bid 
factors). The focus has therefore been on two 
important factors in a bidding competition, i.e. 
market conditions and number of bidders. 
Other factors in the experiment are held 
constant (i.e. project duration, location, 
contract type, client type) in establishing a 
setting that the subjects are familiar with, thus 
allowing their experience to manifest itself 
effectively.  
The experiment also does not consider the 
direct effect of bidding decisions on future 
events since the 20 projects were released at 
once. No feedback information is given to the 
respondents at the end of each round as both 
round of the experiments are independent, 
being based on different market conditions 
scenarios. It is felt that inclusion of 20 projects 
is necessary to generate a reasonable data 
set and to reflect that contractors are selective 
in their decision to bid given that bid enquiries 
are received continuously. It is also recognized 
that the subjects tend to be more risk seeking 
in an experimental setting, although it is 
believed that industry practitioners who are 
willing to spend times on non-rewarding 
academic studies (in this case two rounds of 
experiment) will respond genuinely since many 
stated they would do so.  
SAMPLE PROFILE   
A total of 60 construction professionals 
participated in the bidding experiment for two 
rounds. Of these, 11 were from AUS, 18 from 
HK and 31 from SIN. The overall response 
rates for HK and SIN are 30.0% and 30.7%, 
respectively. For the AUS respondents, the 
response rate is 64.7% based on a total of the 
17 invitations sent through personal contacts. 
Nine of the AUS respondents were from New 
South Wales, two from Melbourne and one 
from Perth. A majority of them are chief or 
senior estimators of large construction firms 
with 8 to 30 years of experience in the industry. 
While for the HK and SIN respondents, around 
90% of them are from senior management 
level including director, managing director, 
estimating and contracts manager who have 
background experience in bidding. Also, the 
HK and SIN respondents have an average of 
21 and 20 years of experience in the industry 
respectively, and around 70% of them involved 
in 80 to 100% of their organization bidding 
exercise. 
COMPARING CONTRACTORS’ 
WILLINGNESS TO BID  
Table 1 shows the percentages of the AUS, 
HK and SIN respondents opted to bid 
according to market conditions and number of 
bidders. Although the experiment design for 
the AUS respondents was based on N = 2 to 
20, it can be seen that all AUS respondents 
declined to bid when the number of bidders 
exceeded 10, even in recession.  The increase 
in number of respondents opted to bid when N 
= 10 in recession can be explained because 
fewer jobs are available in recession. The AUS 
respondents pointed out that number of 
bidders and bidding costs are their main 
concerns in bid/no-bid decision. It is worth 
noting that number of bidders was identified as 
being the most important factor affecting 
contractors’ bid/no-bid decision in New South 
Wales, Australia (Bajaj et al. 1997). In contrast 
to severe competition in early 1980s (Wilson et 
al. 1987), the findings seems to indicate that 
the AUS contractors’ competitive behaviour 
embraces the ethical principles that aim to 
reduce cost and continuous improvement on 
bidding process advocated by the Australian 
Procurement and Construction Council (1999). 
A stark contrast to the AUS respondents, at 
least 30% of the HK and SIN respondents 
opted to bid in competition consisting 30 
bidders, even in boom periods. For the HK 
case, it can be clearly seen that 50% of the 
respondents were willing to bid in competition 
of 30 bidders in recession times, and those 
responded to the follow-up interviews agreed 
  
 
that more bidding attempts will at least 
increase the hit rate in surviving during hard 
times. Dyer and Kagel (1996) refer this 
phenomenon as simple survivorship pressure 
that applied to both the new market entrants 
as well as experienced contractors. On the 
other hand, 33% of the HK respondents who 
still submitting bids in boom times when 
number of bidders is considered large 
highlighted that this was done to fulfil other 
pricing objectives, for example, to maintain the 
relationship with client and to get a feel for the 
market. Indeed, the interviewees expressed 
that they are ‘numb’ to the intense competition 
in the HK construction market and perceive 
there is little point to consider number of 
bidders in their bidding decisions.  
Considering the SIN cases, those declined to 
bid agreed that it is a waste of resources to bid 
when number of bidders becomes 
unreasonably large. They complained that bid 
prices are always on the low side if there are 
too many bidders, particularly in recession, 
and someone who makes a big mistake in 
pricing will win the job.  
This group of contractors urged a paradigm 
shift in the local contracting practice 
concerning extensive use of competitive 
tendering involving too many companies, and 
clients’ focus on the lowest price in awarding 
contracts. It is worth nothing that SIN 
contractors have made the similar 
recommendation in an earlier study by Dulaimi 
et al. (2001).  
COMPARING THE PROPORTIONS OF ‘BID’ 
RESPONSES     
The total number of ‘bid’ responses received 
from the AUS, HK and SIN respondents were 
1045, 3141 and 3560, respectively as shown 
in Table 2. The corresponding average 
number of times each respondent bid within 
each group was 95, 175 and 115. Each 
respondent from HK on average bid 
approximately twice as much as AUS 
respondent. A chi-square test shows that there 
is a significant difference in the bid/no-bid 
responses for the three groups of respondents 
(χ2 = 604.91; df = 2; p = 0.001). The phi 
measure shows a low to moderate association 
between the bid/no-bid responses and 
country/territory (φ = 0.18; p = 0.001). These 
results are not surprising given that contractors 
operating in different construction market 
environments are unlikely to be similar in their 
decision to bid behaviour. The more relevant 
question concerns the proportional differences 
in ‘bid’ responses among the groups. 
Table 3 shows the proportional differences of 
‘bid’ responses at 95% confidence interval and 
the sample odds ratio through paired-group 
comparisons. It can be seen that the lower and 
upper bounds of the confidence intervals for 
both the AUS vs. HK and AUS vs. SIN 
comparisons are negative, suggesting that the 
  
No. of bidders, N % of respondents opted to bid 
Boom Recession 
AUS HK SIN AUS HK SIN 
2 100 - - 100 - - 
4 100 100 100 100 100 100 
6 91 100 100 91 100 100 
8 55 83 94 55 100 100 
10 27 67 90 45 83 90 
14 - 50 71 - 72 87 
18 - 39 42 - 61 65 
24 - 33 29 - 50 39 
30 - 33 29 - 50 35 
Table 1:  Respondents opted to bid according to market conditions and number of bidders 
  Decision to bid   
Country/ territory Bid No-bid Total 
AUS 1045 (33.9) 2035 (66.1) 3080 
HK 3141 (54.5) 2619 (45.5) 5760 
SIN 3560 (35.9) 6360 (64.1) 9920 
Note: % of total in parentheses  
 
Table 2: Bid / no bid responses according to country / territory 
  
 
probability of a ‘bid’ decision for AUS is lower 
than the HK and SIN respondents. Further 
evidence can be found in the sample odds 
ratio wherein there were 43 ‘bid’ responses 
from the AUS respondents for every 100 ‘bid’ 
responses from the HK respondents. The 
estimated odds of a ‘bid’ response are 2.32 
(i.e. 1/0.43) times higher for the HK than the 
AUS respondents. Interestingly, the difference 
in proportions of ‘bid’ responses between AUS 
and SIN is less than 0.04 (i.e. -0.0387, -
0.0004), even with about 30% of the SIN 
respondents opted to bid up to N = 30 as 
discussed earlier. This seemingly small 
difference can be partly explained because the 
Singapore respondents are very selective in 
their decision to bid for competition consisting 
large number of bidders, and thus fewer bids 
were submitted. As described earlier, they are 
concerns about the bidding costs and project 
profitability; perhaps they will only bid for 
projects fall within their organization strategic 
domain. The estimated odds of a ‘bid’ 
response are only 1.08 (i.e. 1/0.92) times 
higher for the SIN than the AUS respondents. 
Considering the paired-comparison between 
HK and SIN, the positive confidence intervals 
(i.e. 0.17, 0.20) suggest that the probability of 
a ‘bid’ decision for HK is 17 to 20% higher than 
the SIN respondents. Although the HK and 
SIN respondents’ willingness to bid appears to 
be quite similar, the estimated odds of a ‘bid’ 
response for HK are 2.14 times higher than the 
SIN respondents. This paired-group analysis 
suggests that the construction market 
environment in HK is the most competitive 
among the three as reflected in its 
considerably higher estimated odds of a ‘bid’ 
response as compared to the SIN and AUS 
respondents. 
Figure 1 shows the breakdown of proportions 
of ‘bid’ responses according to country/ 
territory, market conditions and number of 
bidders. Inline with decreasing probability of 
winning, it can be seen that all AUS, HK and 
SIN respondents’ proportions of ‘bid’ 
responses decrease as the number of bidders 
increases. However,  the AUS case was 
something of a surprise in which higher 
proportions of ‘bid’ responses were recorded in 
booming than in the recession scenario when 
N = 2 to 4. This is contrary to the general belief 
that contractors bid more in recession when 
fewer jobs are available. It can also be clearly 
seen that there are rapid drops in proportions 
of ‘bid’ responses for the AUS case when N > 
4, taking 100 opportunities to bid, only three 
bids were recorded when N = 10 in boom 
periods. As revealed in the discussions, some 
of the AUS respondents noted that they are 
keener in competition of less bidders, N = 2 to 
4 given the higher probability of winning.  
Both HK and SIN respondents generally bid 
more in recession when competition becomes 
fierce. These phenomenons are similar to that 
of de Neufville et al. (1977). However, the HK 
proportions of ‘bid’ responses for both the 
booming and recession scenarios are 
considerably higher than SIN, providing further 
evidence on the intense competition in HK 
construction market environment. It can be 
seen that the HK proportions of ‘bid’ 
responses are identical when N = 4 to 6 for the 
booming and scenarios. In other words, the 
probability of a ‘bid’ decision is not likely to 
change if N ≤ 6 in boom periods in which we 
expect approximately 75 attempts out of 100 
bidding opportunities. This extends to N ≤ 8 for 
recession when competition becomes fierce 
with bidding attempts increased to 85 out of 
100 bidding opportunities. The same 
phenomenon of constant proportions of ‘bid’ 
responses can also be seen in SIN case 
where the probability of a ‘bid’ decision is not 
likely to change if N ≤ 6 in both the booming 
and recession scenarios (i.e. approximately 55 
attempts out of 100 bidding opportunities). The 
high responsiveness towards bidding 
opportunities among the HK and SIN 
respondents can partly be explained because 
the relatively small construction markets in 
these two city states due to geographical size 
limitations may not able to support the growth 
of the existing number of firms. 
95% CI for true difference in proportions of bid Sample odds 
ratio Lower bound Upper bound 
-0.2271 -0.1849 0.43
-0.0387 -0.0004 0.92
0.1705 0.2024 2.14
 
Table 3: Differences in proportions of 'bid' responses and the sample odds ration
through paired-group comparisons 
  
 
Interestingly, the HK respondents’ proportions 
of ‘bid’ responses in boom times are still higher 
than the proportions of bid in recession of AUS 
and SIN for majority of the number of bidders’ 
scenarios. It would seem that the bidding 
competition within the HK construction market 
environment akin to ‘lottery’ game given the 
high proportions of ‘bid’ responses. A chancy 
process which requires the contractors to bid 
for many jobs that come along. In short, ‘if you 
aren’t in you can’t win’. In conjunction with the 
paired-group analysis, the evidence is 
suggestive that the construction market 
environment in HK is the most competitive; this 
is followed by the SIN and AUS, respectively. 
This ranking appears to indicate that the lesser 
the government intervention on bidding 
competition, the greater will be the intensity of 
competition and vice versa. Other competitive 
situations would have to be analysed, and 
subjected to statistical test, before we could 
confidently generalize this observation.  
CONCLUSIONS   
  
This paper sets out to explore the AUS, HK 
and SIN contractors’ bid/no-bid decision in 
response to different intensity of competition 
according to two extreme market conditions 
scenarios, i.e. (i) boom times with low need for 
work, and (ii) recession times with high need 
for work. Data were collected via a designed 
experiment so as to make direct comparisons 
possible.  
The experimental results show that all AUS, 
HK and SIN respondents adhere to the 
decreasing probability of winning wherein the 
proportions of ‘bid’ responses decrease as the 
number of bidders increases. Contrary to 
general belief, it was found that the AUS 
proportions of ‘bid’ responses were higher in 
booming than in recession when N = 2 to 4, 
indicating that some AUS respondents were 
keener in competition of not more than four 
bidders notwithstanding the prevailing market 
conditions. In addition, All AUS respondents’ 
declined to bid when number of bidders 
exceeded 10, which is in stark contrast to HK 
and SIN where most respondents, at least 
30% of them, opted to bid in competition of 30 
bidders, even in boom periods. A chi-square 
test shows that the bid/no-bid responses were 
significantly different among these three 
groups of contractors operating in different 
market environments.  
The evidence is suggestive that the 
construction market environment in HK is the 
most competitive with considerably higher 
proportions of ‘bid’ responses; this is followed 
by the SIN and AUS, respectively. This ranking 
tends to suggest that the lesser the 
government intervention on bidding 
competition, the greater will be the intensity of 
competition and vice versa. In addition, it 
would seem that the bidding competition within 
the HK construction market environment akin 
to ‘lottery’ game given the high proportions of 
‘bid’ responses. A chancy process which 
requires the contractors to bid for many jobs 
that come along. In short, ‘if you aren’t in you 
can’t win’.  
Clearly, it is difficulty to capture all aspects of 
the complexities involved in contractors’ 
decision to bid behaviour, in this case the 
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focus is on market conditions and number of 
bidders, for contractors operating in different 
construction market environments. Other 
factors are possible in similar study to reveal 
further aspects and with different degrees of 
emphases. A suggestion for further research is 
to focus on the extent to which culture (e.g. 
Chinese vs. Western) affects contractors’ 
competitive behaviour. 
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